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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000602

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK

REF: GENEVA 0583 (JCIC-XXXII-010)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[¶1.](#) (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-017.

[¶2.](#) (U) The text at paragraph 3 below is the official translation of a paper containing "Russian Questions on the Completion of Continuous Monitoring at Votkinsk and Closure of Points of Entry in Connection with Expiration of the START Treaty." The questions in the paper were raised at a working group meeting on July 21, 2008 (Reftel). The paper was provided to the U.S. Delegation on July 23, 2008.

[¶3.](#) (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXXII
July 23, 2008

Russian Questions on the Completion of Continuous
Monitoring at Votkinsk and Closure of Points of Entry
in Connection with Expiration of the START Treaty

In order to prepare its plans for assisting the United States of America in activities related to the completion of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty, the Russian Federation proposes that the U.S. side provide the following information:

[¶1.](#) A list of the items, as well as their weight and size, that the U.S. intends to take out of the Russian Federation, as well as the approximate time frame for their removal.

¶2. The types of transport the U.S. plans to use to remove the items from the territory of the Russian Federation, with reference to the list of items, as well as the planned times of their use.

¶3. A list of items the U.S. intends to donate to organizations in the Russian Federation, a list of those organizations, and the approximate times when the items will be donated.

¶4. A list of the items the U.S. plans to sell commercially in the Russian Federation, the presumed purchasers (if they have been identified), as well as the approximate beginning and end of the sale period.

¶5. A list of the items the U.S. plans to dispose of in the Russian Federation, as well as the methods of disposal and the locations and time frames for this work, including who will perform the work. And, in this connection, restrictions (or special requirements) related to any fire, explosion or environmental hazard posed by the items or to any other condition of the items.

¶6. And other information, at the discretion of the U.S. side, that helps to increase the effectiveness of measures related to the completion of continuous monitoring activities.

¶7. Proposals regarding the removal of inspection and other equipment (including radiation detection equipment) from the points of entry.

We would also like to get the U.S. side's thoughts on the Russian side's role in carrying out this work, including funding of the work.

This information will enable the Russian side to determine the scope of the measures needed to assist the United States of America in carrying out its plans and to identify the national-level entities responsible for their implementation.

End text.

¶4. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text